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Article 6

ESSAY

ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE
AFTER GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
Terry A. Maroney*
INTRODUCTION

In Graham v. Florida,1 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without possibility of parole
for a nonhomicide crime committed when the offender was under the
age of eighteen. 2 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion 3 in this closely
watched case is remarkable for a number of reasons, chief among
them its rejection of the "death is different" mantra 4 that had for so
long prevented principles from death penalty jurisprudence from
informing constitutional bounds on term-of-years sentencing.5 Having broken down that wall, the Graham Court easily applied to juvenile
life without parole the developmental conclusions that had partially
6
underlain its earlier abolition of the juvenile death penalty.

© 2011 Terry A. Maroney. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Associate Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. Thanks are due to
Christopher Slobogin and Laurence Steinberg. Research assistance ably provided by
Jinghui Lim.
1 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010).
2 See id. at 2034.
3 Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor. See id. at 2017.
4 See id. at 2030.
5 Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. Ruv. 1145, 1146-49, 1186-97
(2009) (critiquing, pre-Graham,adherence to that mantra).
6 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (applying developmental analysis of Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005)).
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Developmental neuroscience-that is, the study of life-course
changes in the brain's structure and function 7-contributed to this
aspect of Graham. Justice Kennedy, citing to amicus briefs from the
American Psychological Association and American Medical Association, wrote that: "[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control
continue to mature through late adolescence."8
In an earlier article, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in
JuvenileJustice,this author noted the pendency of Graham and its companion case, Sullivan v. Florida.9 Because both Terrance Graham and
Joe Sullivan offered scientific arguments closely paralleling those
made by the defendant in Roper v. Simmons,'0 and because largely the
same lineup of amici had done the same, I predicted that "[t]he
Court's treatment of developmental neuroscience may provide valuable insight, largely absent in Roper, to its attitude toward its relevance."'" Did it?
It did. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Graham clarified what his
opinion in Roper had left ambiguous: the Court (or at least a majority
of its members at that time) believed neuroscience relevant to general
propositions as to the normal developmental course of adolescence.
To the extent that such propositions drove conclusions as to juveniles'
special legal status, neuroscience partially supported those
conclusions.
This Essay analyzes the influence of neuroscience in Graham and
offers some predictions as to the decision's future impact. As this
issue was explicitly set to one side in False Promise, the Essay provides
an opportunity to both supplement that article and reflect on its con7

See Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in JuvenileJus-

tice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 89, 90 n.1 (2009) (providing definition). I use the term
interchangeably with "adolescent brain science."
8 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22-27, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No.
08-7412), and Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2059 (2010) (No. 08-7621), 2009 WL
2236778, at *22-27 [hereinafter Brief for the APA]; Brief for the American Medical
Ass'n & the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party at 16-24, Graham, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412), and Sullivan, 130 S.Ct. 2059 (No. 08-7621), 2009 WL 2247127 [hereinafter Brief for the
AMA]).
9 130 S. Ct. 2059 (per curiam); see Maroney, supranote 7. On the same day that
it decided Graham,the Court dismissed certiorari in Sullivan as having been improvidently granted. See Sullivan, 130 S.Ct. at 2059.
10 543 U.S. 551.
11 See Maroney, supra note 7, at 120.
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clusions. Part I distills its essential arguments and reports on subsequent developments. Part II more closely dissects the neuroscientific
arguments made by the defendants and amici in Graham and Sullivan,
as well as the Court's treatment of those arguments. Part III reflects
on the possible impact of the decision. I predict that its most dramatic effects will have little to do with developmental neuroscience.
As to that science, I argue that the Graham Court gave it the maximum
weight it presently can bear. The decision therefore provides welcome support for legal policy-makers-whether in courts or legislatures-who seek to draw modestly on such science in reinforcing
commitments to the special legal status of youth. But the predictable
post- Graham temptation to place even greater weight on developmental neuroscience should-for the many reasons articulated in False
Promise, which remain unaltered-be resisted.
I.

ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE

In False Promise I sought to measure the legal impact of developmental neuroscience by identifying and analyzing cases in which arguments relying on such science-sometimes marginally, often
centrally-had been made before the courts. I demonstrated that
most such arguments fail to persuade and sought to explain why. Just
as important, I undertook to explain why developmental neuroscience
claims should have only a modest legal impact, and that only within
limited parameters. My essential claims were as follows.
Over the last decade, developmental neuroscience has generated
a scientific consensus that, when considered in the aggregate, teen
brains are structurally and functionally different from those of both
children and adults. As those differences are nonnegligible and as
they appear to map onto teens' social and decisional immaturity, juvenile advocates and defenders quickly began to incorporate neuros12
cientific claims into ones grounded in developmental psychology.
Nowhere was this truer than in RoPer.13 Defendant's counsel and
14
amici highlighted neuroscience in both briefing and argument.
The Roper Court relied in part on developmental principles to hold
that the juvenile death penalty offends the Eighth Amendment, and
in so doing nodded to the proffered "scientific" studies.' 5 Though the
12
13
14
15

See id. at 100-03.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
See Maroney, supra note 7, at 106-07 & nn.74-76.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
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Court nowhere singled out brain science, Roperwas widely interpreted
16
to reflect its endorsement of such science.
Building on a theme begun before Roper, prominent theorists
then held out developmental neuroscience as evidence strongly supporting a "diminished culpability" model that, they argued, compelled
a host of policy and legal conclusions going well beyond the death
penalty. 17 Juveniles and young adults followed suit, raising brain science claims in a wide variety of cases. 18 Close review of those cases
revealed three core phenomena.
First, many courts regarded brain science claims as falling outside
the narrow parameters dictated by applicable doctrine. 19 In the context ofjuvenile life without parole (JLWOP), most courts believed the
"death is different" rationale and Roper's apparent approval ofJLWOP
together to foreclose the relevance of Roper-style developmental arguments, including their neuroscientific aspect. 20 Courts instead tended

to rely on gross disproportionality tests, to which the relevance of
developmental factors was unclear, to uphold virtually all term-ofyears sentences. 2 1 A similar heavy deference to state legislative
schemes underlay courts' tendency to reject brain-based challenges to
transfers to adult court, liability for felony murder, construction of
mens rea terms, such as specific intent and reasonableness, and waiver
of

rights.

22

Second, courts frequently rejected brain science claims where
23
they appeared either to contradict or to duplicate record facts.
Exemplifying the former were cases contesting the mens rea element
of specific intent. Many such cases involved juveniles whose actions
suggested relatively high levels of planning and forethought, taken to
obviate the relevance of findings that juveniles generally lack adult
16 See Maroney, supra note 7, at 108 & n.85.
17 See ELIZABETH S. Sco-rr & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE
28-60 (2008). -[D]iminished culpability" incorporates two distinct concepts: that

juveniles, relative to adults who commit equivalent crimes, categorically are (a) less
blameworthy and (b) more amenable to rehabilitation. Id. It therefore might rather
be called a "diminished culpability/enhanced potential" model. See Maroney, supra
note 7, at 111; cf Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The
Fourth Option, 95 IowA L. REv. 1, 3, 37-38 (2009) (using alternative term "diminished

retribution" to describe the model).
18

See Maroney, supra note 7, at 116-45.

19 See id. at 118-44.
20 See id. at 121-22.
21 See id. at 122.
22
23

See id. at 129, 138-39, 141-42.
See id. at 122-23, 126, 133-38, 140-41, 146-48.
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levels of such capacity. 24 In the latter category fell cases in which
courts believed brain science to add little to evidence of immaturity
that already was before factfinders-or that would add little to adults'
"common sense" understanding of the attributes of youth. 2 5
Third, the minority of courts that did credit neuroscience
appeared to do so only marginally. 26 That is, such science likely was
invoked to buttress a conclusion to which they already were inclined
and that was adequately supported by ample other grounds.
Taken together, the analysis demonstrated that the persuasive
power of adolescent brain science in the courts was falling far short of
expectations. Much of this shortfall was attributable to contemporary
doctrine, which tends to be hostile toward most juvenile claims. 2 7 The
case analysis sought not to critique doctrine but to demonstrate the
28
fate (and likely fate) of claims made in that difficult environment. I
also sought to explain the limited impact of adolescent brain science
by reference to confirmation bias, as legal decisionmakers filter such
29
evidence through prior beliefs and values.
Beyond the external limitations of extant doctrine and the internal limitations of human bias, I also argued that aspects of the science
itself necessarily limit its relevance. 30 Because the data support conclusions only at the aggregate level, they shed little light on the developmental status of any given young person, except insofar as she is a
member of the group. While links between structural attributes,
brain-level functional data, and externalized behaviors are strengthening, they remain largely speculative. Juveniles' relative deficiencies do
not invariably mean they fall below legal thresholds. As the described
developmental trends extend into early adulthood, they do not provide a compelling basis for extending benefits to persons under eigh24

See, e.g., id. at 147-48.

25

See, e.g., id. at 140-41.

See id. at 127-28, 143-44, 154-56.
27 The legal environment surrounding juvenile offending unquestionably has
become far more harsh over the last two decades. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2050 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Maroney, supra note 7, at 101-03. Only
26

very recent years have seen signs of a reversal. See id. at 175.
28 In addition to fostering greater understanding of how a major theoretical
move in juvenile justice is playing out on the ground, which informs critical assessment of that move, such an exercise has two practical payoffs. In the longer term, it
illuminates aspects of doctrine that may be appropriate targets for direct reform.
More immediately, it can assist counsel in making intelligent, strategic decisions as to
how neuroscience ought (and ought not) to be invoked.
29

See Maroney, supra note 7, at 170-72.

30

See id. at 145-65.
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teen but not to "emerging adults. '3 1 Taking brain development as the
primary metric by which to dole out legal rights and protections,
moreover, could be understood to threaten juvenile autonomy and to
invite discriminatory distinctions between groups according to their
32
relative propensities toward early or late development.
Thus, courts are largely justified in taking adolescent brain science as-at most-a body of evidence lending marginal support to
traditional (if embattled) assumptions underlying youths' special legal
status.3 3 Transformation in juvenile law and policy will flow not from
that science but rather from recommitment to creating both societal
conditions that support healthy growth and humane legal responses
34
that maximize youthful offenders' future potential.
Other juvenile justice theorists have in the interim endorsed
much of this author's analysis. 3 5 And since FalsePromisewent to press,
setting aside for the moment Sullivan and Graham, the case law has
continued to develop largely along the same lines. Mens rea challenges have continued to run aground. A New Mexico teenager convicted of premeditated murder, for instance, was denied
postconviction relief despite an argument that her brain was "controlled primarily by the impulsive and hyperactive amygdal[a]," such
that she was "likely physiologically and biologically incapable of forming" specific intent to kill. 36 The court found that (even if true) such
a claim amounted to a defense of diminished capacity, not allowed
under state law. 3 7 Brain science has been said to be cumulative in
31
32
33
34
35

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 154-56.
id. at 156-60.
id. at 166-67.
id. at 172-74.
Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 17, at 37-38 (noting that "judicial non-

chalance toward the new neurological findings," substantiated by False Promise, "however unexpected amongst juvenile-justice advocates, is perfectly consistent with the
observation ... that [under current doctrine] intentional conduct that is not the

result of significant mental impairment is generally seen as fully culpable"). Slobogin
and Fondacaro advocate abandonment of the "diminished retribution" model in
favor of one focused only on specific deterrence. See id. at 3-8. Emily Buss urges
reevaluation of the current "[c]onventional wisdom" that law should "assign rights

and responsibilities" in lockstep with "assessments of children's capacities documented in the scientific research," as such an approach wrongly suggests that such
capacities are "ascertainable and fixed." See Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and
Should Not) Learn from Child Development Research, 38 HosTRA L. REv. 13, 13, 34 n.96,
37-48, 49 & n.144 (2009).
36 State v. Torres, No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0302-PR, 2010 WL 715994, at *1-2 (Ariz. Ct.

App. Mar. 1, 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting petition).
37 See id. The lower court found that developmental neuroscience constituted
newly discovered evidence for purposes of postconviction relief. See id. at *1.How-

2011]

ADOLESCENT

BRAIN

SCIENCE AFTER GRAHAM

light of record evidence of a defendant's youth, life challenges, and
psychological deficits.3 8 As before, adolescent brain science has found
some moderately receptive ears. The Iowa Supreme Court, in a
broad-ranging opinion allowing a twenty-one-year-old to challenge a
statutory rape sentence dramatically enhanced by a prior delinquency
finding, cited its understanding of Roper as relying on "psychosocial
and neurological studies" that "show that juvenile brains are less developed and that, as a result, they are less culpable than adult offenders." 39 A juvenile who presented expert testimony on adolescent
development, including brain development, was permitted to make
his case as to why such evidence might support Alaska's adoption of a
sentencing mitigator for "developmental immaturity." 40 Thus, some
ever, the appellate court agreed with its determination that the prohibition on diminished-capacity defenses did not depend on the reason for lesser capacity, whether
.normal development of the adolescent brain" or disease, and that the new evidence
therefore was legally irrelevant. Id. at *2.
38 See State v. Zebroski, No. 9604017809, 2010 WL 2224646, at *11-12 (Del.
Super. Ct. May 14, 2010). Zebroski was sentenced to death for a murder committed
when he was eighteen, taking him outside Rope's protection. He argued for postconviction relief on the ground that, inter alia, trial counsel should have presented evidence of the "[n]eurodevelopmental immaturity of the adolescent brain." Id. at *9.
The court pointed out that Zebroski had at the penalty phase presented significant
mitigating evidence, going to his youth, dysfunctional upbringing, and the neural
effects of drug use. See id. The court further remarked that "typical adults can be
counted on to understand that young people make ill-considered and bad judgments,
and drug use only makes that worse," even if they do not understand the "physiological underpinnings for it." Id. at *12; see also State v. Daniels, No. 2009AP1893-CR,
2010 WL 2900403, at *1-3 (Wis. Ct. App.July 27, 2010) (affirming lower court's imposition of multidecade sentence despite defense request that it consider defendant's
"adolescent, nineteen-year-old brain," largely because the court did consider youth as
a possible mitigator).
39 State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009). These comments went to
the court's assessment of the conduct underlying the old delinquency count, committed when the defendant was twelve, not the adult commission of statutory rape. See id.
at 885. The court regarded Bruegger's dramatically enhanced sentence as stemming
from a highly "unusual convergence" of factors, and believed that under the Iowa
Constitution he should have the opportunity to present individualized evidence as to
its unfairness. See id.
40 Smith v. State, 229 P.3d 221, 223, 230-32 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). Smith was
sixteen when he participated in a first-degree assault. Id. at 224. The Court of
Appeals of Alaska recounted Smith's proffered evidence that, inter alia, juveniles'
"brains are still developing and their frontal lobes have not yet fully matured," characterizing such evidence as having partially underlain Roper. Id. at 230. Signaling that
such evidence might be relevant to mitigation, it found that the lower court had not
provided enough insight into its assessment of that (and other) evidence as to permit
meaningful appellate review, and remanded for clarification. Id. at 229-31. The
court made a similar finding as to a recognized nonstatutory mitigator: extraordinary
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courts have invoked the science as a small part of a larger constellation of reasons to provide opportunities for relief; 41 others have
refused to do so, both because of law and because of fact; and no case
has emerged that suggests a pattern meaningfully at odds with that
42

discovered in False Promise.
II.

DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE IN GRAHAM AND SULLIVAN

Which brings us to Graham and Sullivan. It is undeniable that
Justice Kennedy's reliance on adolescent brain science was more
transparent in Graham than it had been in Roper, the actual reliance
may have been identical, but only in Graham was it explicit. This Part
synopsizes both the proffered neuroscientific arguments and the
Court's treatment of those arguments.
As commentary on these cases surely will be legion, an abbreviated account will suffice. Graham and Sullivan both were convicted in
Florida of nonhomicide offenses and sentenced to life without possibility of parole, but there the similarities ended. Graham was older at
the time of the crime-sixteen-but his offenses were relatively
minor, consisting primarily of participation in an unsuccessful restaurant burglary and subsequent violation of parole. 43 Sullivan, in conpotential for rehabilitation. This is the same court (and two of the same justices) that
similarly had recognized some limited space for neuroscientific argument in Cottingv.
State, No. A-9909, 2008 WL 4059580 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2008), and Ling v. State,
No. A-9228, 2008 WL 2152028 (Alaska Ct. App. May 21, 2008). See Maroney, supra
note 7, at 127 nn.154 & 156.
41 Cf Page v. State, 995 A.2d 934, 951-53 (R.I. 2010) (Flaherty, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing, with reference to brain science, that an eighteen-year-old should be sentenced to life but with possibility of parole (citing Jeffrey
Fagan, End Natural Life Sentences for Juveniles, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 735, 744
(2007); Lauren Fine, Death Behind Bars: ExaminingJuvenile Life Without Parolein Sullivan v. Florida and Graham v. Florida, 5 DUKE J. CONsT. L. & PUB. POL'V 24, 41-42
(2009))).
42 Indeed, the same pattern appears to be holding true post- Graham as well. False
Promisenoted the pendency of Williams v. Ryan, No. 05cv0737-WQH (WMc), 2010 WL
3768151 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2010), in which Andy Williams argued that an MRI of his
brain should have been examined before he was permitted to plead guilty and be
sentenced for shooting students and teachers at his high school. See Maroney, supra
note 7, at 134-35 & nn.180-83. The districtjudge has now rejected those arguments,
holding that neither the MRI nor expert testimony on adolescent brain science was
likely to reveal relevant evidence as to Williams's mental state and that the individualized diagnosis of a qualified psychiatrist was both more relevant and sufficient. See
Williams, slip op. at 13-22, 2010 WL 3768151, at *13-22.
43 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010). One of Graham's accomplices assaulted an adult restaurant manager with a steel bar, causing injuries. See id.
The prosecutor exercised her discretion under Florida law to proceed against Gra-
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trast, was extremely young-thirteen-but his crime was vastly more
serious, involving the rape of an elderly woman while burglarizing her
home. 44 Graham had no prior juvenile record; Sullivan had a lengthy
one. 45 The primary difference in their arguments was the age below
which they urged the Court to prohibit JLWOP for nonhomicide
offenses. 4 6 Sullivan's youth allowed greater emphasis on findings
related to very early adolescence, and he accordingly sought to drive a
wedge between the neurological capacity of younger and older
teens. 47 On the fundamental point, though, the two offered a united
ham in adult criminal court, where he pleaded guilty and received a sentence of probation with adjudication of guilt withheld. See id. Six months later, Graham was
arrested and accused of participating in an armed home invasion robbery with adult
accomplices, engaging police in a car chase, and fleeing on foot. Id. at 2018-19. He
admitted only the last of these, which constituted a violation of his parole. Id. at 2019.
At sentencing on the reinstated charges of burglary and attempted robbery, the court
rejected the recommendations of both the probation department and the state, and
imposed a sentence of life without parole. See id. at 2019-20. Under Florida law, such
a sentence gives no possibility of release during one's natural life absent a grant of
executive clemency. Id. at 2020 (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003)); Brief for
Petitioner at 12-23, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412) [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioner Graham].
44 See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (No.
08-7621) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner Sullivan]; Brief of Respondent at 4-6, Sullivan, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (No. 08-7621) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent]. Given the
seriousness of the charges, in accordance with Florida law Sullivan was automatically
transferred to adult criminal court. See Brief for Petitioner Sullivan, supra, at 2 n.1
(citing FLA. STAT. § 985.56(1) (2003)). Sullivan had spent considerable time in juvenile detention, where he had a poor disciplinary record. See Brief of Respondent,
supra, at 6. After his trial and conviction by jury, that history was relied on by the
court to impose the most serious possible adult sentence on the sexual battery counts.
See id.
45 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018-19; Brief of Respondent, supra note 44, at 4-5.
46 Not surprisingly, Graham (whose parole violation shortly predated his eighteenth birthday) asked the court to set the line at eighteen. Sullivan asked that the
line be set no lower than the fourteenth birthday. See Transcript of Oral Argument at
5, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument,
"); Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20,
Graham] ("We draw the line at 18 ....
Sullivan, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (No. 08-7621) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument,
Sullivan] ("I would like you to adopt a rule that bans life without parole for any child
under the age of 14.... But I support a line ... at 18."). This differential also allowed
Sullivan to make a stronger case on the "unusual" prong of the test, as imposition of
JLWOP was dramatically less frequent for the very young. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Sullivan, supra, at 25-27.
47 See Brief for Petitioner Sullivan, supra note 44, at 13-14 ("Among adolescents,
young teens have the least capacity to imagine consequences, regulate their wildlyshifting emotions, and resist peer pressure, and the most capacity for change, precisely because they are at the beginning of the most intense period of rapid growth in
their lifetimes."); id. at 15-16 ("[B]rain structure at this early developmental stage
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front: the Court should rely on psychology and neuroscience to
the
expand its Roper analysis into the JLWOP context, ideally finding
48
sentence cruel and unusual as to all (nonhomicidal) teens.
Indeed, the neuroscientific arguments offered by Sullivan, Graham, and their amici were virtually identical to those made in Roper,
and they channeled those arguments primarily through Roper's view of
adolescents as categorically less culpable. 49 Graham argued that, as
"studies employing brain imaging technology show that adolescents'
heightened propensity for risk-taking and poor decision-making correlates with immature cortical brain function,"' 50 juvenile offending is
less blameworthy by virtue of having "a biological basis."5 1 Similarly,
Sullivan asserted that young teens "are neurologically and emotionally
hard-wired for sensation-seeking, impulsivity, poor foresight, worse
also explains teens' inability to make the type of judgments at 13 that they will comfortably handle at 17.... [as the brain's maturation] is barely underway."); id. at 59
("[T]he line could properly be drawn at 18. However, as the scientific data... attest,
13- and 14-year-olds as a class are much less mature than 17-year-olds.").
48 See Brief for Petitioner Graham, supra note 43, at 26-27; Brief for Petitioner
Sullivan, supra note 44, at 9-10.
49 The only real difference in briefing was that the scientific account was updated
so as to incorporate analyses generated in the few intervening years. See, e.g., Brief for
Petitioner Graham, supra note 43, at 42 (citing James M. Bjork et al., Developmental
Differences in PosteriorMesofrontal Cortex Recruitment by Risky Rewards, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE
4839 (2007); Neir Eshel et al., Neural Substrates of Choice Selection in Adults and Adolescents: Development of the VentrolateralPrefrontaland Anterior Cingulate Cortices, 45 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1270, 1278 (2007)). The AMA and APA amicus briefs were in this respect
materially indistinguishable from those they submitted in Roper. Though the AMA
brief technically was nonpartisan, its substantive arguments indisputably tended
strongly in favor of the Petitioners. See Brief for the AMA, supra note 8; see also Brief
forJ. Lawrence Aber et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Graham,130 S.
Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412) (explaining interest of"an interdisciplinary group of psychologists, social scientists, and neuroscientists who have devoted their careers to the
study of adolescent development and behavior").
Interestingly, brain science played a far less significant role in oral argument than
it had in Roper. Graham's argument focused largely on the relevance of Roper, the
virtue of a categorical approach, issues of prison programming, and constitutional
bounds on when and how eventual release must be made available. See Transcript of
Oral Argument, Graham, supra note 46, at 9, 25-26, 52-53. Counsel made several
references to "science" in arguing that judgment as to potential for redemption must

await maturity. Id. at 13-14. Sullivan's argument was largely taken over by discussion
of a procedural issue and of the actual numbers of children servingJLWOP sentences.
He reiterated the developmental findings of Roper, but not in neuroscientific terms.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, Sullivan, supra note 46, at 23.
50 Brief for Petitioner Graham, supra note 43, at 42 (citing Bjork et al., supranote
49; Eshel et al., supra note 49).
51 Id. at 41-43.
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judgment, and control failure. ' 52 The State of Florida chose not to
engage with these arguments, except in suggesting that Graham was
operating from "the mistaken premise that juveniles as a whole,
including mature 16- and 17-year-olds, simply cannot control their
53
actions and cannot be deterred from committing violent crimes,"
and that Sullivan's "medical and social science research" simply confirmed that juveniles are different, "a fact that state legislatures have
54
known for decades" and had incorporated into their juvenile laws.

The Graham majority gave the defendants everything they had
been looking for, and then some. Declining to use the gross disproportionality test of Harmelin v. Michigan5 5 and Ewing v. California,56 it
characterized the case as implicating "a particular type of sentence as
it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range
of crimes." 57 Such a "categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence," it held, was controlled by the "categorical approach" used in
death penalty cases such as Roper.58 The Court favorably assessed the
"objective" evidence against JLWOP for nonhomicides, 59 noted that
the availability of that sentence may be an unintended consequence of
unrelated legal changes, 60 and remarked on the international consen61
sus against the practice.
Critically, in reaching an "independent judgment" on the ultimate Eighth Amendment question it adopted in full Roper's analysis as
to "the nature of juveniles." 62 It is in this context that the Court
invoked "brain science" in support of the proposition that 'Juvenile
and adult minds" are fundamentally different.63 Adolescents'
reduced culpability, lesser propensity to be deterred, and greater
capacity for change, it held, pulled as strongly againstJLWOP as they
52 Brief for Petitioner Sullivan, supra note 44, at 37.
53 Brief of Respondent at 58, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412).
54 Brief of Respondent, supra note 44, at 10, 41-44, 46.
55 501 U.S. 957, 997-1006 (1991).
56 538 U.S. 11, 23-31 (2003).
57 Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2022-23.
58 Id. at 2021-23.
59 See id. at 2023-26.
60 See id. at 2025-26 (explaining that states had made it easier and more frequent
for juveniles to be tried as adults and did not undertake to change adult sentencing
laws to which such juveniles became subject; such a sequence of events does not signify deliberate choice of JLWOP).
61 See id. at 2033-34 (asserting that while international consensus does not control, it demonstrates that "the Court's rationale has respected reasoning to support
it").
62

63

See id. at 2026.

See id.
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had against the death penalty. 64 The Court placed particular weight

on its view that at the time of sentencing it was not possible to know
whether a young person would forever pose a danger. 65 Thus, it held,
irrevocable judgment poses a substantial risk of inaccuracy, lends itself
to undue subjectivity, and "improperly denies the juvenile offender a
chance to demonstrate growth and maturity" once his character is
more well formed. 66 The Graham Court, on these bases, established a
categorical rule prohibiting the sentence for nonhomicides committed before age eighteen. 6 7 Presumably because this rule included the
relief requested by Sullivan, the Court dismissed certiorari in his case
68
as having been improvidently granted.
The concurrences and dissents may be quickly summarized.
Chief Justice Roberts would have used the case-by-case gross disproportionality test, with the gloss that age must be considered a relevant
offender characteristic, and on that basis would have found Graham's
sentence unconstitutional. 69 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia
(and in part by Justice Alito), would have relied on Eighth Amendment concepts operative at the time of the founding to reject either a

64 See id. at 2026-30.
65 See id. at 2029.
66 Id.; see id. at 2032-33 (JLWOP "gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison
walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope," and is "complicit" in the
squandering of human potential). The Court also found that the same qualities that
make youth less appropriate candidates for lifelong punishment "put them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings," with the result that ajudge orjury might
sentence a youth more harshly than is warranted. Id. at 2032.
67 See id. at 2030.
68 See Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (per curiam). Dismissing certiorari obviated the need to (1) resolve that case's significant procedural issues and (2)
directly confront its markedly worse set of facts. However, Justice Kennedy did point
to Sullivan's case to illustrate "the flaws of Florida's system," in whichJLWOP could be
imposed on a very young person "based only on a discretionary, subjective judgment
by a judge or jury that the offender is irredeemably depraved." Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2031. This statement strongly suggests that he would have reached the same legal
conclusion even on those facts, much as he had in Roper despite the horrifying details
of that crime. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-59 (2005).
69 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036-39 (Roberts, CJ., concurring). ChiefJustice Roberts considered Graham's case "exceptional." Id. at 2042. His crimes were relatively
minor, at least as compared to "murder or rape," while his sentence was "far more
severe" than that usually imposed for such crimes. Id. at 2040. Further, he seemed
particularly immature, and no one "other than the sentencingjudge appears to have
believed that Graham deserved to go to prison for life." Id. at 2039-40. However,
ChiefJustice Roberts would have leftJLWOP as an option in cases involving "far more
reprehensible" crimes. Id. at 2041.
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categorical or case-by-case challenge. 70 He also took issue with the
majority's recourse to "psychology and brain science," asserting that
such data are irrelevant to constitutional rulemaking and that the
Court had misstated the data in any event. 7 1 Justice Alito underscored
his understanding that the opinion had no effect on term-of-years
sentences with possibility of parole. 72 Finally, Justice Stevens (joined
by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor) tersely pronounced that while
Thomas "would apparently not rule out a death sentence for a $50
theft for a 7-year-old," "[s] ociety changes," "[k] nowledge accumu73
lates," and standards of decency always will continue to evolve.
III.

STILL A FALSE PROMISE?

If the post-Roper years are any guide, the post-Graham years will
see a flurry of activity among juvenile justice advocates and defenders.
Certainly this is true of cases directly affected by the holding, as 123
inmates in eleven states are entitled to resentencing.7 4 With competent representation, these former juveniles may be expected to bring
forward evidence designed to both place the offense conduct in context and to demonstrate subsequent maturation. But a surge at both
the policymaking and litigation levels is certain to extend much further. 75 More, since the Court now has endorsed brain science as a
70 See id. at 2044 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from "both choices to
expand proportionality review"); id. at 2048 n.3 (noting that law "at the time of the
Founding" permitted capital punishment of persons as young as seven).
71 Id. at 2054; see infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
72 See id. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito also asserted that Graham
had abandoned his as-applied claim. See id. He joined Parts I and III of Justice
Thomas' dissent, see id., which recounted the facts and rejected all aspects of the
majority's categorical analysis, respectively. See id. at 2043, 2047-56 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
73 Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring).
74 See id. at 2023-24 (majority opinion) (citing PAOLO G. ANNINO ET AL.,JUVENILE
LIF WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NON-HOMICIDE OFFENSES (2009), available at http://www.
law.fsu.edu/faculty/profiles/annino/Reportjuvenile-lwop-O92009.pdf (estimating
that 109 juveniles in the United States were serving life without parole for nonhomicides)); see also PAOLO G. ANNINO ET AL., JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONHOMICIDE OFFENSES (2009), available at http://law.fsu.edu/faculty/profiles/annino/
ReportjuvenileLifeSentence 072009.pdf (estimating in an earlier report that 111
juveniles were serving life sentences without parole for nonhomicides). The Court
supplemented the report with its own research, arriving at a total of 123. Graham, 130
S. Ct. at 2023-24.
75 See Maroney, supra note 7, at 109-16 (noting post-Roper excitement propelled
advocacy far beyond the death penalty). For example, one state court already has
determined that Graham's reasoning prohibits a de facto LWOP sentence for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide. See People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870 (Ct.
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useful body of research, those advocating greater protection of juvenile offenders surely will invoke it with even greater frequency. It
therefore is more important than ever to ensure that such claims are
accurate, given only the weight they are due, and integrated into juvenile justice theory in a principled, consistent manner.
In this Part, therefore, I offer some predictions as to Graham's
impact. I evaluate three levels of likely impact, on the legal relevance
of adolescent brain science; the legal reach of developmental science;
and the contours of adult criminal sentencing and parole.
A.

A Modest Boost for Adolescent Brain Science

Graham's explicit mention of brain science both boosts the profile of that science and confirms the widespread understanding that it
was positively evaluated by the Roper Court. 76 The scientific evidence
provided by the parties and amici was virtually identical, 7 7 and they
argued on the basis of that science even more forcefully in Roper. A
very short interval of time separates the cases and both opinions were
authored by Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy in Graham invoked
brain science in support of precisely the analytical proposition to
which it was argued relevant in Roper,78 and which in the Roper opinion had come with the ambiguous "scientific-study" label. 79 The
nearly inescapable conclusion is that the Roper Court was as influenced by adolescent brain science as was the Graham Court.80
App. 2010) (involving ajuvenile who would not be eligible for parole until after turning eighty-eight).
76 See Maroney, supra note 7, at 108 & n.85 (noting academic dispute over
whether Roper fairly was so understood).
77 See Brief for Petitioner Graham, supra note 43, at 36-43; Brief for the APA,
supra note 8, at 22-27; Brief for the AMA, supra note 8, at 16-24; Brief for Respondent at 15-24, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the
American Psychological Ass'n & the Missouri Psychological Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9-15, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633); Brief for the American
Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 9-20, Roper, 543 U.S.
551 (No. 03-633).
78 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27.
79 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
80 I say nearly inescapable because it is possible that the Roper Court was unpersuaded as to the accuracy and relevance of developmental neuroscience, but that
developments in the interim were sufficient to persuade the Graham Court. I believe
this explanation unlikely. The interim scientific studies were no more dramatic than
the foundational pre-Roper studies, juvenile-brain explanations for teen behavior had
gained public notice before Roper, and certain Justices-particularlyJustice Stevensearlier had signaled receptiveness to such evidence. See, e.g., In re Stanford, 537 U.S.
968, 971 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The only personnel change was the replacement of Justice Souter with Justice Sotomayor, and there is no reason to believe she
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This clarification, though, welcome as it may be for many, does
not signify that the science now should be understood to pack more of
a persuasive or jurisprudential punch than I previously have argued.
The Graham Court (and, by implication, the Roper Court) gave developmental neuroscience precisely the maximum weight that the science presently can bear.
In reaching this conclusion, it is instructive to compare the arguments with which the Court was presented with the approach it took.
In translating the science into advocacy, the parties and amici
gave it different levels of "spin." The American Psychological Association (APA) took a relatively lighter touch with neuroscience, while the
American Medical Association (AMA) leaned on it more heavily. The
AMA, for example, framed its entire argument under a heading stating that immaturities in the "adolescent brain provide a biological
basis for [adolescents'] behavioral immaturities."8 1 The APA both
flipped the brain-behavior relationship and downgraded the relative
importance of the former. It led with developmental psychology and
proposed more modestly that "psychosocial immaturity is consistent
with emerging research regarding brain development." 82 The parties'
briefs mirrored those differing approaches, with Graham aligned
more with that of the APA and Sullivan with that of the AMA. Compared with Graham, Sullivan far more frequently used words such as
"brain," "neurological," "brain circuitry," and "frontal lobe"; he
included a lengthy and detailed footnote entirely devoted to neuroscience; and he invoked overtly deterministic language such as "hardwired."

83

came to the Court with any unique interest in or commitment to developmental
neuroscience.
81 Brief for the AMA, supra note 8, at ii, 4. To be sure, the AMA did sometimes
use more moderate language suggesting less certainty as to causation. See id. at ii
(noting that brain immaturity "associated with" behavioral difficulties and teen brains
"tend to" show different neural functioning); see also id. at 3 (acknowledging, as it had
in Roper, that "science cannot gauge moral culpability" but can "shed light" on attributes legally relevant to that determination).
82 Brief for the APA, supra note 8, at i, 22. The APA devoted approximately five
text pages to brain science, while the AMA devoted approximately nineteen. The

APA also included a separate argument thatJLWOP is a grossly disproportionate punishment. See id. at 28-33.
83

See Brief for Petitioner Sullivan, supra note 44, at 16-18 n.15. Graham's discus-

sion of neuroscience was both shorter and took a more subordinate role within the
developmental argument. See Brief for Petitioner Graham, supra note 43, at 41-43
(stating that teen immaturity has "a biological basis," but using language such as "cor-

relates" and acknowledging "continuing research" into "precise mechanisms").
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Justice Kennedy's opinion relied on adolescent brain science far
less extensively than had any of these parties. However, that reliance
more closely resembled the approach of Graham and the APA. Either
the above-described spin differential was lost on the Graham Court or
it wisely chose to take the lighter-touch route. 84 The Court offered
brain science as one source of data tending to confirm a general proposition about gross differences between adolescents and adults that
seem to map onto capacities about which the criminal law tends to
care.8 5 Specifically, it cited that science-along with "psychology"-as
demonstrating that capacity for behavioral control matures over the
course of adolescence, including "late" adolescence.8 6 This assertion
is both substantively defensible and offered at the appropriate level of
generality.
First, the proposition in support of which the Court cited brain
science is developmentally accurate and legally relevant. The Court
did not suggest that teens' behavioral deficits are absolute and invariable, but rather that greater difficulty in behavioral control is a relatively stable group characteristic, one not properly attributable only to
malevolence. 8 7 Though the Court made this point in direct support
of its conclusions as to juveniles' diminished culpability, it goes as well
to their rehabilitative potential. 88 Assessment of blameworthiness
hinges partially on the degree to which the defendant's behavior was
subject to deliberate control. Similarly, assessment of dangerousness
hinges partially on the degree to which capacity for such control is
likely to increase and be exercised. The former assessment informs
moral judgment as to the offender's intent and character, while the
84 See Maroney, supra note 7, at 165 n.306 (positively evaluating the approach of
the APA brief). The first explanation seems likely. See id. at 160-65 (asserting that
science often is flattened in translation to law). However, the Court may have chosen
to "temper" the advocates' strongest assertions. See Buss, supra note 35, at 45. A third
explanation is that the Graham Court credited only Graham's "spin" since it did not
rule on the merits of Sullivan. This is highly implausible. Its decision granted relief
just as surely to Sullivan, the amicus briefs to which it directly cited were filed in

support of both cases, and the brain science almost certainly was taken in by the
Court as a whole.
85 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-27 (2010); see also Maroney, supra
note 7, at 166-67 (advocating such use of the science).
86 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27. While everyday observation long has shown
that actual behavioral control increases, the science speaks also to capacity, a gloss that
invites the sort of diminished-culpability judgment in which the Court engaged.
87 See id.
88 The Graham Court did not sharply differentiate between these two points.
Though capacity for change most obviously speaks to rehabilitative potential, the
Court also cited that capacity as a factor lessening juveniles' moral blameworthiness.
Id. at 2026.
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latter informs utilitarian determination of the most effective response.
More, that juveniles tend for this reason to be both less blameworthy
and (eventually) less dangerous affects the likelihood that the same
will be true of any given juvenile.
Second, adolescent brain science buttresses confidence in that
proposition at just this level of generality. Consider this 2009 assessment offered, in a letter to AMA counsel, by a consortium of prominent developmental neuroscientists:
In comparison with the adult brain, the adolescent brain is immature in brain processes that contribute to the executive control of
behavior as determined by experimental studies that characterize
basic aspects of behavior. These experiments do not test complex
behavior such as the control of responsible behavior in a direct
manner.

89

This is not, perhaps, the stuff of scintillating advocacy, but it is the
stuff of responsible science. And-minus the important point about
the ecological validity of extant experimental studies-it corresponds
quite closely to what the Graham Court actually said.
In making a very high-level determination of gross group tendencies for the purpose of setting policy, then, brain science is one, relatively minor, source of legally relevant data-and this is precisely how
the Graham Court used it. Though the specific tendency on which the
Court focused was behavioral control, other tendencies-such as differences in emotional processing-logically should carry as much (but
no more) weight where they similarly relate to a legal policy judgment.90 Though the opinion may be read to justify a far broader set
of implications for developmental neuroscience, such a reading would
be inaccurate and undesirable.
B.

Potentially Greater Influence of Developmental Research

Of likely greater import are Graham's implications for the legal
influence given to developmental research as a whole. Broader developmental arguments-including those based on behavioral studies
89 Letter from Beatriz Luna et al., Dir. of Lab. of Neurocognitive Dev., Univ. of
Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., to E. Joshua Rosenkrantz, Counsel to the Am. Med. Ass'n (July

16, 2009) (on file with author). In the remainder of the letter, the authors break that
overall conclusion into subpoints going to the state of research on brain structure,
brain function, neural connectivity, emotional processing, and behavioral outputs.
90 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 ("[D]evelopments in ... brain science continue
to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example,
parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence." (citing Brief for the APA, supra note 8, at 22-27; Brief for the AMA, supra
note 8, at 16-24)).
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and criminology-are the vehicle through which neuroscientific ones
are delivered, and the vehicle unquestionably is more important than
its passenger. 9 1 Graham made clear that the general developmental
principles underlying Roper are relevant to any aspect of doctrine relying on assumptions about youths' attributes and capacities. 92 This
move had been urged by scholars and advocates pre-Graham, on the
logic that fundamental truths about adolescence as a developmental
stage do not vary according to the specific legal context in which adolescents are judged. 9 3 The "death is different" mantra, however, made
it easy to confine Ropers findings to the narrow question of whether
94
juveniles ever could be classified as among the "worst of the worst."
Graham decisively took down that firewall. As Justice Scalia pithily
remarked at oral argument, challenges to term-of-years sentencing
never had hinged on whether an offender is the "worst of the worst,"
but at most whether she is "the worse of the worse. '9 5 The Graham
Court found that the differential was, for purposes of applying developmental analysis, insignificant. Developmental principles therefore
96
should be regarded as a constant.
Thus, after Graham the diminished culpability/enhanced potential theory of juvenile justice appears to have become not just the
near-consensus academic view9 7 but the operative jurisprudential
one. 98 The impact of this shift could be far-reaching. If the Court
91 But see Maroney, supranote 7, at 167 n.313 (advocating cautious, moderate use
of behavioral data as well, despite its stronger pedigree and greater direct relevance).
92 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27.
93 See Maroney, supra note 7, at 119-20 (noting that "scholars and advocates"
argued that "developmental science would appear to bear as directly on the underlying purposes of JLWOP . .. as on the death penalty" (citing Barry C. Feld, A Slower
Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons forJuveniles Sentenced to Life Without
Parole, 22 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 9, 10 (2008))). Even under this logic,
though, the developmental principles will continue to have different impacts, for they
will map differently onto the specific legal question. The point here is that nothing
forecloses the principles' exportation to other legal contexts for evaluation under the
applicable standards.
94 See Maroney, supranote 7, at 120-22 (noting that "many courts have stated that
Roper applies only in the death penalty context" (citing Culpepper v. McDonough,
No. 8:07-CV-672-T-17, 2007 WL 2050970, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 13, 2007); Connell v.
State, 7 So. 3d 1068, 1007 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008))).
95 Transcript of Oral Argument, Sullivan, supra note 46, at 19.
96 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-28, 2030-33.
97 See Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 17, at 3-4.
98 In addition to the Graham majority, Chief Justice Roberts appears to be on
board with this proposition. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2039 (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
("Roper's conclusion that juveniles are typically less culpable than adults has pertinence beyond capital cases, and rightly informs the case-specific inquiry I believe to

2011]

ADOLESCENT

BRAIN

SCIENCE

AFTER

GRAHAM

believes that youth are meaningfully less morally culpable for
equivalent actions, less responsive to deterrence, to the point of
degrading (though not eliminating) its penological value, and markedly more amenable to rehabilitation, there is no logical reason why
those principles should not inform all determinations reflecting categorical assessment of those same phenomena.
Graham's logical implications for sentencing thus might be
understood as follows: whatever the maximum punishment an adult
could receive for a certain crime, a juvenile should get less, and
whatever the minimum adult opportunities to demonstrate rehabilitation, a juvenile should get more. This iteration of Graham's developmental logic could call into question a variety of sentencing schemes.
For example, it might render suspect any scheme that mandates identical sentencing of chronological juveniles and adults. Graham's developmental logic also could be understood to apply to legal issues other
than sentencing. 99 Group-level assessment as to juveniles' relative
immaturity is just as relevant to the imposition of felony-murder liability (particularly for unintentional homicide), as well as to the construction of mens rea statutes that incorporate external norms, such as
negligence and recklessness. 10 0 Moreover, the Court's assertion that
juveniles' immaturity places them "at a significant disadvantage in
criminal proceedings," coupled with its conclusion that "criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at
all would be flawed," together suggest an opening for more robust
review of juveniles' competence to waive Miranda, stand trial, waive

be appropriate here."); id. at 2040 ("There is no reason to believe that Graham
should be denied the general presumption of diminished culpability that Roper indicates should apply to juvenile offenders."). Even Justice Thomas does not argue with
the general notion "that juveniles generally are less culpable and more capable of
growth than adults." Id. at 2052 (ThomasJ., dissenting).
99 Id. at 2031 (majority opinion) ("[C]riminal procedure laws that fail to take
defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed."). Some language in
Graham could be interpreted to limit its reach to questions of sentencing-and only
the most "severe" sentencing at that. See id. at 2026 (describing Roper as establishing
that the lesser culpability of juveniles makes them less deserving "of the most severe
punishments" (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005))); cf. id. at 2046
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("No reliable limiting principle remains to prevent the Court
from immunizing any class of offenders from the law's third, fourth, fifth, or fiftieth
most severe penalties as well."). This statement is better understood as describing the
context in which the developmental principles were established, not a limit within
which they should be made operative.

100 See Maroney, supra note 7, at 170 (mentioning, as part of a nonexhaustive list,
accomplice liability).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

86:2

counsel, and plead guilty. 10 1 Legislatures, of course, never were constrained in their ability to craft developmentally appropriate policy in
any of these areas; but to the extent that courts felt themselves constrained, Graham creates more breathing room within which to do so.
Just as Ropds reasoning was (before Graham) widely interpreted
by the courts to apply only to capital sentencing, Graham's could be
understood to apply only to the precise frame within which it was
articulated: nonhomicide JLWOP. Indeed, some courts already have
taken just that stance. 10 2 But this effort at containment is unlikely to
be airtight, and is likely to weaken over time. That the Graham Court
easily allowed developmental logic to cross what had been regarded as
a nearly impenetrable divide between capital and term-of-years sentencing signals that other doctrinal divisions are likely to be ineffective
containment devices.
But perhaps this shift will not be quite so sweeping as many
doubtless hope. Two distinct questions unresolved by Graham suggest
this to be so.
First is the continuing relevance of harm. The Graham Court
leaned heavily on the distinction between homicide and nonhomicide
offenses, stating that the culpability of a juvenile who commits a
nonhomicide is "twice diminished," and strongly intimating (as it had
in Roper) that JLWOP would be constitutional for a homicide conviction.1 03 This is, of course, dicta, and may not survive the inevitable
101 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032 ("Juveniles mistrust adults and have limited
understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors
within it. They are less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers to aid in
their defense. Difficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel seen as part of the adult world a
rebellious youth rejects, all can lead to poor decisions by one charged with ajuvenile
offense." (citations omitted)). The Court has just taken certiorari over a case that
raises the issue of whether a court may, or must, consider age when evaluating
whether a juvenile was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda rights. See In reJ.D.B.,
686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010). This portion of Graham raises the inference that the Court may be interested in overturning that portion
of Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 469-70 (6th Cir. 2010) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (complaining that while Graham did not control the question of
whether conviction for a crime committed when a chronological juvenile could form
necessary last "strike" triggering LWOP for now-adult defendant, its logic should have
been allowed to inform that determination).
103 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 ("[A] juvenile offender who did not kill or
intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability."). The Court invoked Kennedy
v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), to underscore its view as to the importance of
death. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027; see also id. at 2041 (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(noting the "Court's apparent recognition that it is perfectly legitimate for ajuvenile
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next legal challenge. But the dictum is inconsistent with Graham's
developmental logic as articulated above. To see how this is so, consider the sentencing possibilities for homicide. Adults convicted of
capital murder face a maximum possible punishment of death;
juveniles do not. If a juvenile is convicted of a death-eligible homicide, then, JLWOP arguably embodies the contemplated concession
to youth.10 4 But most homicides are not death-eligible and, therefore,
carry a maximum possible punishment of life without parole.10 5 If a
homicide committed by a juvenile was (for reasons other than age)
not death-eligible-which is by no means an easy call 106-the developmental logic means that the juvenile should receive either a shorter
term of years or "meaningful opportunity" for parole from a life
term.10 7 To hold otherwise is to place a sufficient level of importance
to receive a sentence of life without parole for committing murder"). Courts already
have begun to rely on this aspect of Graham to uphold JLWOP for homicide offenses.
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 50 So. 3d 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (upholdingJLWOP
for a sixteen-year-old convicted of first-degree murder).
104 See Miller v. State, No. CR-06-0741, 2010 WL 3377692 (Ala. Crim. Ct. App. Aug.
27, 2010) (denying Graham challenge on basis that ajuvenile sentenced to LWOP for
a death-eligible homicide receives the second-harshest punishment for committing
the worst crime). I say arguably because whether a crime is death-eligible is not fully
ascertainable until after completion of the penalty phase. See infra note 106. Thus,
though the Miller court asserted that the defendant could have been sentenced to
death but for his juvenile status, there is no way of knowing whether that is actually

true.
A number of states with no death penalty provide for maximum sentences of
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/life-without-parole (last visited March 28, 2010) (fourteen of fifteen non-death-penalty states so provide). Further, even capital-sentencing states
impose LWOP more frequently than death. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163,
178-79 (2006) (noting that Kansas' sentencing scheme "is dominated by the presumption that life imprisonment is the appropriate sentence for a capital conviction"
if prosecution cannot make case for death).
106 This is so for several reasons. Prosecutors have discretion at the front end, by
choosing the arguably death-eligible cases in which such a penalty actually will be
sought. Even more important, at the back end, death eligibility depends on a jury
determination of aggravating and mitigating factors under the applicable state statute. See Marsh, 548 U.S. at 173-74 ("[A] state capital sentencing system must ...
permit ajury to render a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on
a death-eligible defendant's record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of
his crime." (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976))). Theoretically, it is
literally not possible to know which homicides are death-eligible until after the trial
and penalty phase, which will never happen in any juvenile case post-Roper.
107 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 ("A state is not required to guarantee eventual
freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a non-homicide crime. What the state
must do, however, is give defendants . . . some meaningful opportunity to obtain
).
release ....
105

life without parole. See Life Without Parole, DEATt
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on the harm caused as to trump the developmental principle. And
this is what Graham appears to do, as it seems to leave undisturbed a
system by which a juvenile and an adult convicted of identical noncapital homicides could receive identical LWOP sentences, despite the
fact that the juvenile's culpability is at least once diminished. 0 8 As
Thomas pointed out in dissent, thus to single out homicide is "peculiar," because many homicides-for example, felony murder via
accomplice liability-are more obviously amenable to (partial) developmental explanation than are many nonhomicides, like violent, premeditated kidnapping and rape. 10 9 The dictum thus has less to do
with the Court's view of juveniles than with its valuation of harm. 110
Second is the tension between individual and categorical assessment, a tension driving Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence.'
Though Graham approached JLWOP categorically, it is not clear
whether it signals a preference for that approach in other contexts.
Indeed, the decision might point in opposing directions. Consider,
for example, possible implications for transfer to adult court. Transfer schemes that mandate adult treatment for all juveniles charged
with designated offenses rest on the assumption that, as a rule, commission of such an offense demonstrates adult-level blameworthiness
and dangerousness. 11 2 That assumption has consequences, as the
choice of court profoundly affects both the procedure juveniles are
108 Cf Miller, 2010 WL 3377692, at *8 (acknowledging that ajuvenile's culpability
is diminished by age, but is not "twice diminished," in Graham's language, if he killed
his victim).
109 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2055 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2041-42
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (labeling the Court's categorical conclusion "unnecessary"
and "unwise" as it "ignores the fact that some non-homicide crimes ...are especially
heinous or grotesque, and thus may be deserving of more severe punishment" and
juveniles' diminished culpability does not necessarily mean "that their culpability is
always insufficient tojustify a life sentence" (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
571 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 853 (1988))).
110 See id. at 2055-56 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the apparent concession to homicide demonstrates that "the Court does not even believe its pronouncements about the juvenile mind").
111 See id. at 2041-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The proper place for categorical
as opposed to individual judgment was a fault line in Roper as well. See Roper, 543 U.S.
at 599-604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's conclusion that all
juveniles are death-ineligible and advocating instead for individualized
determination).
112 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 985.227(2) (2003) (current version at FLA. STAT.
§ 985.557 (2010)) (permitting Sullivan's treatment as an adult). The common refrain
capturing this idea is "adult crime, adult time." Graham instead suggests that there is
no such thing as ajuvenile "adult crime," but only crimes committed by juveniles.

20111

ADOLESCENT

BRAIN SCIENCE AFTER GRAHAM

due and the possible consequences they face.1 3 Graham's developmental logic counsels just the opposite assumption: that is, that the
juvenile has both diminished culpability and enhanced potential
despite satisfying the elements of the crime. 1 4 Under a categorical
approach, Graham's developmental logic thus could be understood to
foreclose transfer altogether. But such an outcome appears highly
unlikely in light of the Court's evident comfort level with transfer,
even of the very young." 15 It is also a political nonstarter: some form
of transfer has been contemplated since the invention of juvenile justice itself.11 6 A more plausible response to the new post-Graham
assumption, then, would be to allow it to be overcome in individual
cases. The obvious mechanism would be judicial transfer, in which
the judge determines by evidence whether the particular juvenile is
likely to be adequately controlled and rehabilitated by the juvenile
justice system." 7 But Graham reflects a high level of skepticism as to
whether judges can make such case-by-case assessments, at least while
the offender is still ajuvenile."a 8 Thus, a conundrum: Graham's logic
simultaneously suggests that mandatory transfer rests on a faulty
113 See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) ("[W]aiver ofjurisdiction is a 'critically important' action determining vitally important statutory fights of
the juvenile." (citing Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Watkins v.
United States, 343 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1964))).
114 Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2040 (Roberts, CJ., concurring) (establishing that juvenile offenders are entitled to a "general presumption" of immaturity).
115 Nowhere does the Graham Court intimate that either Graham or Sullivan
wrongly had been prosecuted as adults or had a right to juvenile treatment.
116 See Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, Ill. Laws 131, amended by Act of June 4,
1907, Ill. Laws 77 (giving judge discretion to order any delinquent juvenile to be
treated according to adult law).
Kent, 383 U.S. at 552-65 (holding order of the Juvenile Court waiving
117 See, e.g.,
its jurisdiction invalid as it did not comply with the statutory requirement of a "full
investigation," which includes the consideration of particular factors of individual
cases, such as those listed in id. app. at 566-67).
118 See Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2031-32 (noting that courts taking a case-by-case
approach may not, "with sufficient accuracy," be able to "distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for change"). The
Court's skepticism about jurors was evident in Roper. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 572-73 (2005). Graham is rather startling in its extension of that skepticism to
judges. See Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2042 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The sentencing
judge in Graham certainly provided the Court with ample basis for concern; his assessment seemed highly exaggerated, even irrational. See id. at 2019-20 (majority opinion); id. at 2040 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The Court could have chosen to factor
the judge's ill temper into a judgment that the sentence was disproportional for Graham. That it was seen instead as underlying a categorical rule signals a belief that
such judgments are relatively common and not likely to adequately be curbed by
appellate review.
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assumption as to the nature of youth, and that individualized transfer
requires judges to make predictions no human is capable of making.
This tension may be eased at the margins,1 19 but likely will be tolerated, and the parameters of transfer will continue to be shaped less by
I20
developmental concerns than by pragmatic and political ones.
As these two open issues demonstrate, developmental principles,
even after Graham, will go only so far. While the opinion invites
greater reliance on such principles in a wider variety of doctrinal
areas, they cannot be expected always to trump other principles to
which the juvenile law also accords value.

The strongest rejoinder to this reading of Graham is that the Court was skeptical
only about judicial predictions that are literally lifelong and irrevocable. In contrast
to imposition ofJLWOP, judicial transfer determinations ask not whether the juvenile
is likely to be rehabilitated in his lifetime but, rather, in the time remaining before
juvenile jurisdiction terminates. This distinction may well be sufficient to justify retention ofjudicial waiver; the risk of inaccuracy may be tolerable given the shorter predictive time frame, and other penological justifications-like incapacitation-might
be stronger than in the JLWOP context. But transfer decisions are similarly irrevocable, except where ajurisdiction provides for reverse transfer (a decision generally also
made while the juvenile is still ajuvenile). See, e.g., PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT 2,

9-10 (1998) (describ-

ing reverse waiver statutes). Their impact also is lifelong, as the transferred juvenile
acquires a permanent criminal record and, often, a lengthy sentence that fundamentally alters the remainder of his natural life. The difference with JLWOP is one of
degree, not of kind. If the Court is sufficiently uncomfortable only with the most
extreme predictive judgment on the continuum, other concerns must be operative.
119 One way to ease this tension would be to very substantially alter adult-court
criminal sentencing ofjuveniles. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE
155-56 (2005) (bemoaning "the absence of a youth policy for waived juvenile offenders in criminal courts," such that "there is a tendency to ignore the youth of offenders
once they have been transferred ... as if the mandate of a waiver was to regard the
offender as an adult"). Many states provide minors with limited opportunities for
reduced sentencing in the adult courts-including Florida-but such sentences tend
to be the exception rather than the rule. See Brief for Petitioner Graham, supranote
43, at 6-8 (describing statutes under which Graham might have been sentenced).
Another would be to rely much more heavily on so-called blended-sentencing
schemes, under which juveniles eventually may receive adult sentences if they fail to
demonstrate rehabilitation before jurisdiction expires. See Maroney, supra note 7, at
114 n.113. Such schemes would ease the tension only if they were used to keep significant numbers of juveniles out of the adult system, not to expand consequences for
those who would not have been transferred in any event.
120 SeeZIMRING, supra note 119, at 139, 144 (stating that transfer has political value
as a "safety valve" that preserves public support for the institution).
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C. More Robust Oversight of Criminal Sentencing
Ironically, perhaps, Graham is likely to have its most dramatic
effects not in the juvenile context but in adult criminal sentencing.
The foundations from which these effects will spring can be succinctly
stated, though the contours of the effects themselves are unpredictable and will unfold over the long term.
"'Death is different' no longer." 12 1 Though neither the Court
nor the parties gave any intimation that the distinct procedural
aspects of the capital trial now apply to noncapital cases, 1 22 appellate
review of term-of-years sentencing is likely now to be more robust.
Some classes of offenders-the mentally retarded come immediately
to mind-are likely now to make a parallel challenge to life without
parole (LWOP). That class is almost certain to urge the Court to carry
its Atkins v. Virginia123 analysis across the now-eroded boundary.
Indeed, the opinion suggests that such a categorical challenge may be
brought against any "sentencing practice," not just LWOP, and by any
identifiable "class of offenders."1 24 Though not all such challenges
will be successful, they are now more plausible.
Moreover, as Justice Thomas's dissent notes with displeasure,
Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence "breathes new life into the caseby-case proportionality approach," potentially reversing the extreme
narrowing of that approach in recent years. 125 If age matters to that
analysis, a broader range of other offender characteristics should as
well.
Finally, legislatures and courts now must flesh out the amorphous
concept of a "meaningful opportunity" for parole. 126 The Graham
Court left the specifics in the first instance to the states, specifying
121 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (the decision "eviscerates
the distinction" between capital and noncapital sentences for purposes of proportionat 2038-39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("Treating juvenile life
ality review); see also id.
sentences as analogous to capital punishment is at odds with our longstanding view
that 'the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than
degree.'" (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983))).
122 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Graham, supra note 46, at 52 (counsel for
petitioner) ("[W]e are not asking that the procedural rules in the intricate individualized death penalty sentencing scheme be . . .moved over to the noncapital cases.");
id. at 42-53 (question of justice Alito) ("[Iisn't that where this, logically, is going?").
123 536 U.S. 304, 317-21 (2005) ("The reduced capacity of mentally retarded

offenders provides a .. .justification for a categorical rule making such offenders
ineligible for the death penalty.").
124 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23.
125 Id. at 2044 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
126 See id. at 2030 (majority opinion).
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only that they must provide "some realistic opportunity" 12 7 to demonstrate "maturity and rehabilitation." 12 Conversely, the state must be
allowed somehow to show that the offender was in fact "irredeemable."

29

Such enormous, foundational questions going to the mean-

ing of opportunity and redemption cannot help but spill outside the
immediate context. Further, the only juveniles to whom parole eligibility applies are those convicted in adult courts and held in adult
institutions; they all will be chronological adults by the time any
parole decisions are made, meaning the rules established for them are
likely to apply to other parole-eligible adults as well. To be sure, Graham could be construed so as to restrict adult access to parole. It might
be understood to establish a juvenile monopoly on hope.13 0 Such a
construction is not justified by Graham; that juveniles have relatively
greater amenability to reform does not mean adults have none, or
that they have too little to be accorded any legal significance.13 1 Thus,
how the state courts fill in Graham's broad commands, and how the
federal courts evaluate their efforts (as they surely will, and soon),
eventually may affect the entire law governing parole eligibility and
denial.
The potentially biggest action post-Graham,then, not only has little to do with brain science-it likely will have little to do with adolescent development at all.
D.

Confirmation Bias

As this discussion has demonstrated, nothing in Graham suggests
any meaningful alteration to the normative claims advanced in False
127 Id. at 2034.
128 Id. at 2030. The state courts are beginning to grapple with that task in the
juvenile context. See, e.g.,
People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 883 (Ct. App.

2010) ("[C]ommon sense dictates that a juvenile who is sentenced at the age of 18
and who is not eligible for parole until after he is expected to die does not have a

meaningful, or as the Court also put it, 'realistic,' opportunity of release.").
129 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
130 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Graham, supra note 6, at 51 (question ofJustice Kennedy) ("Why does ajuvenile have a constitutional right to hope, but an adult
does not?"); id. (reply of counsel for petitioner) ("[B]ecause the juvenile is different

than an adult ...once you are fully formed, you ... don't have that same inherent
capacity to change."); see also Page v. State, 995 A.2d 934 (R.I. 2010) (upholding

LWOP for an eighteen-year-old, over a dissent arguing that the defendant should be
allowed an opportunity eventually to seek parole).
131 This is, of course, the converse of my point that relative juvenile disability does
not invariably mean such disability reaches legal significance. See Maroney, supranote
7, at 150-51; see also Buss, supra note 35, at 41-42 (warning that reliance on children's
incapacities leads to a "frozen caricature" notion of adulthood, to adults' detriment).
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Promise. The many cautions and limitations it articulated remain in
full force.' 3 2 Rather than revisit them all, I here focus on one that was
on display in Graham: confirmation bias.
Legal decisionmakers tend to accept, or to credit disproportionately, those aspects of the science that move them in the direction of a
result to which they already are inclined, and to reject those that do
not. 133 This phenomenon is evident in that portion of Justice
Thomas's dissent in which he critiqued the majority's reliance on
developmental data. He took no issue with the general idea that "society tends to treat the average juvenile as less culpable than the average
adult." 134 But he focused on studies that appear to provide a basis for
making at least somewhat reliable predictions as to the future dangerousness of an individual young person, even at the time of the
offense. 13 5 Moffitt's highly influential model of adolescent-limited
offending was cited by the APA in support of the proposition that
most juvenile offenders "grow out" of antisocial behavior. 13 6 However, that same model provides an empirical basis from which to judge
which youth are more likely instead to manifest a "life-course persistent" pattern of such behavior.' 3 7 As Thomas pointed out, certain
indicators of such a pattern-such as violent crime at a young agewere present in these cases. 138 One can mount many reasons why
132 See Maroney, supra note 7, at 145-74.
133 See id. at 170-72.
134 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2054 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting, though, that "the
question here does not involve the average juvenile"); see also id. (noting the fact that
JLWOP is rarely imposed "is entirely consistent with the Court's intuition that
juveniles generally are less culpable and more capable of growth than adults"); cf id. at
2042 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (stating that JLWOP should be justified for "some
crimes [that] are so heinous, and some juvenile offenders so highly culpable");
Maroney, supra note 7, at 156 (noting young adults' disproportionate success with
neuroscientific argument and offering a theory that legal decisionmakers tend to
regard juvenile offenders as "unusual juveniles" to whom general lessons do not
apply).
135 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2054-56 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia,
Terrie E. Moffitt, A Review of Research on the Taxonomy of Life-Course Persistent Versus
Adolescent-Limited Antisocial Behavior, in 15 TAKING STOCK 277, 292-93 (Francis T. Cullen et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Moffitt, Review of Research]; Terrie E.Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-PersistentAntisocial Behavior A Developmental Taxonomy, 100
PSYCHOL. REv. 674, 678 (1993) [hereinafter Moffit, Adolescence Limited]).
136 See Brief for the APA, supra note 8, at 20 (citing Moffitt, Adolescence Limited,
supra note 135, at 685-86, 690).
137 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2054-55 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia,
Moffitt, Review of Research, supranote 135, at 292-93; Moffitt, Adolescence Limited, supra
note 135, at 678).
138 See id. at 2043, 2051-52, 2055-57. Though Justice Thomas did not make this
explicit, his implication may have been that Sullivan was particularly likely under Mof-
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Moffitt's taxonomy is an inadequate basis on which to rest a judgment
of such import, particularly given the option of later measuring
(rather than presently predicting) the offender's trajectory. But that
is not here the point. The point, rather, is that the same body of data
can be read in such a way as to support wildly different outcomes.
One's prior assessment of the correct outcome will influence which
reading appears most convincing. This tail-wagging-dog phenomenon limits the persuasive power of all developmental science, including neuroscience.
CONCLUSION

The impact of Graham is likely to be simultaneously narrow and
sweeping. As to adolescent brain science, I predict that the impact
will be narrow. Within the bounds I previously have delineated, that
science will assume somewhat greater status. That status differential
may-and hopefully will-contribute, though marginally, to legislatures' and courts' recommitment to juvenile justice values. Developmental science as a whole is likely to see a bigger boost in its legal
impact. However, Graham itself suggests that such science often will
take a subordinate role to other considerations-such as harm-in a
manner not consistent with its developmental logiC.' 39 The decision's
downstream effects on term-of-years sentencing and parole are likely
to be the most extensive, but are the hardest now to predict. Finally,
motivated reasoning about developmental science is certain to persist.
Its persistence underscores the reality that science always must assume
a secondary role.
That secondary role is the right one. As I concluded in False
Promise, undue focus on adolescent brain science threatens to obscure
more important, and more treatable, reasons for juvenile offending. 140 I agree with Emily Buss that it also threatens to obscure the
"real reasons" why many-this author included-support special treatment of juvenile offenders.1 4 1 Justice Thomas declared that this posifitt's taxonomy to be a "life-course persistent" offender, given the combination of his

extreme youth, history of recidivism, and a sexually violent crime.
139
140

See id. at 2030 (majority opinion).
See Maroney, supra note 7, at 173-74.

141 See Buss, supra note 35, at 45 ("[F]or many of us, the inclination to favor
greater adolescent autonomy rights and lesser adolescent culpability is driven, not by
a cold calculation of what they can and cannot do, but by an interest in designing laws
to serve minors well."); id. at 64 (emphasizing that the law's concern for youth rightly
is seen not as an accommodation to incapacity but as a reflection of social commitment to "enhance children's development to better achieve the ambitions reflected in
our constitutional rights").
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tion devolves to a "philosophical" one. 142 It is not only that, but it is
largely that. But law reflects philosophical commitments, and this
one-the belief that adults bear a special responsibility to provide
youth with adequate opportunities to reach their potential, no matter
what they have done-legitimately is reflected in the law of juvenile
justice. Whatever the eventual effects of Graham prove to be, one
hopes they reflect a similar commitment.

142

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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